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| Weapons Used by the US Cavalry at the Battle of the Little Bighorn |
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Model 1873 Single-Action Colt .45 The Model 1873 Single-Action Colt .45 (see Figure 1) replaced Civil War revolvers converted to fire rim-fire cartridges. The Army issue had a 7.5-inch barrel but it was also sold for civilian use with different lengths of gun barrel and trade names including “Peacemaker”. The .45 calibre was an effective man stopper and would have been the Cavalry’s shock weapon when mounted. The Colt was sighted to 25 yards at the time of the Battle of the Little Bighorn, but would be later sighted to 50 yards. The 1873 Colt, like the majority of its American contemporaries, was a single-action revolver. The chamber had to be revolved by hand after each shot, which was done by pulling back the hammer and earned it the nickname the “thumb-buster” from U.S. Cavalry troopers. Modern double-action revolvers can have the chamber rotated by trigger pressure, which makes them faster to shoot. At the U.S. Army's insistence, the gun was made into a solid frame design and proved to be both rugged and reliable. It is loaded from a gate rather than broken open. This Western icon was made until 1940. The government was none too pleased when it discovered that it had bought all of the guns produced by Colt in the first year for $13 each yet dealers could buy them for as little as $10.50. Barrel Length 7.5” (190mm) Length 13” (330mm) Weight 380z (1.08kg) Calibre .45” 250-255 gram lead ball backed by 38-40 grains powder. Rifling 6 groove r/hand Capacity six Muzzle Vel 860 Muzzle Eng 420 compared to c650f/s for a typical metal cartridge revolver of the period. Sights Fixed – 25 yards.e, carrying their knapsacks, haversacks, and everything else they needed on campaign. Model 1873 Springfield “Trapdoor” Carbine The 7th Cavalry had used the Spencer carbine in its early Indian battles, which had an effective range of only 300 yards but by the time of the Little Bighorn the U.S. Army was standardising on the Springfield rifle and carbine with the Erskine S. Allin breechblock. The established wisdom is that the U.S. Army did not adopt lever-action multiple shot weapons during the Civil War because of the problems they would create regarding the supply of ammunition. However, I believe that by the time of the Indian Wars the Army viewed the lever-actions weapons as under-powered novelty weapons and that they were equipping their men to fight wars against European equipped enemies or to re-fight the Civil War. The Indian Wars were seen as a minor sideshow in which troops armed to fight on European battlefields would be more than a match for fighting any number of Indians. The Army saw breech-loading rifles and carbines as the way forward. They could fire a much more powerful round at longer ranges than lever-actions. Although lever-actions could give an initially high rate of fire, unless they were equipped with some kind of loading gate, breechloaders in the long run had a higher rate of fire, which was sustainable throughout a battle. Initially the Spencer carbine was converted to an alternative breech-loading system with the stabler cut-off for Cavalry use. The Ordnance Department initially decided to transform existing muzzle-loading Civil War rifles to a breech-loading system using Allin’s "Trapdoor" system to convert them first to .58 rim-fire with the M1865, followed by the M1866 .50-70 CF round. These had reliability problems but were responsible for the victory at the Wagon Box Fight of 1867. In 1872 the Army tested a number of foreign and domestic single-shot breechloaders but stuck with the Springfield Allin system, to avoid paying royalties. The Allin System had been developed at the Government Armouries to reduce the cost, but the U.S. Treasury had already been forced to pay $124,000 to inventors whose patents it infringed. The adoption of the Allin breech gave the advantages of being already familiar throughout the Army, involved no more royalties, and existing machinery at the Springfield Armoury could easily be adapted to its manufacture. The 1873 rifles and carbines were now purpose-made weapons and no longer Civil War conversions. The rifle was to fire the new .45-70-405 centre fire round, but the charge was reduced to .45-55 for the carbine as the rifle charge was considered too heavy for prolonged use in this weapon. These M1873 Springfield carbines (see Figure 2) were used for the rest of the Indian wars, with a number of updated marks, until replaced by the Krag Jorgensen bolt-action rifle in the 1890s. One trooper is known to have carried the full-length rifle version at the battle. Although some authorities have blamed the gun's reliability and tendency for rounds to jam in the breech for the defeat at the Little Bighorn, the carbine was in fact more reliable than anything that had preceded it in U.S. Army service. These weapons were vastly more reliable than the muzzle-loading weapons of the Civil War, which would frequently misfire and cause the soldier to uselessly load multiple rounds on top of each other in the heat of battle. A study of .45-55 cases found at the battle concludes that extractor failure amounted to less than 0.35% of some 1,751 cases tested. Paul L. Hedren, “Carbine Extraction Failure at the Little Big Horn: A New Examination,” Military Collector and Historian (Summer, 1973): pp 66-68; Douglas D. Scott and Richard A. Fox, Jr., Archaeological Insights into the Custer Battle (Norman, 1987). Custer’s men only received their new 1873 Springfield carbines in 1876 and were among the last to do so. Rumours circulated after the battle that the copper cases had fused to chamber walls, allowing the extractor to tear through the case rim. These can be attributed to Reno’s testimony to the Chief of Ordnance that six of the carbines had jammed due to the breech not locking properly during the fight for the bluffs above the Little Bighorn. A trooper under Reno’s command claimed that an officer spent time extracting jammed cases, reloading and passing carbines back to the men. Colonel Ranald Mackenzie after the Little Bighorn battle requested Winchester repeaters for his 4th Cavalry, citing the poor rate of fire of the Springfield breechloader. One potential reason for these failings in the Springfields at the Little Bighorn, could be that the 7th Cavalry had been issued a number of faulty weapons that had been returned by other units. Varnum (in Graham p347) claims that his and probably Custer’s men took the Rifle 70 grain ammunition and not the carbine 55 grain. Could this more powerful rifle round have been a contributing factor in the number of jams that occurred? The oral evidence of gun failures markedly conflicts with the archaeological analysis, which also shows that the .45-55 round was issued. Whatever the case, the complaints about the weapons after the battle show a distinct lack of confidence by the troopers in their main weapon, the Springfield carbine, during the battle. The carbine barrel length was 22 inches long. The rear sight graduated to 500 yards, and a sight lead to 1,290 yards. The carbine would have been rarely used mounted but was used dismounted in a skirmish line, usually in a kneeling position. Most authorities set the effective range for the 1873 carbine at 500-600 yards. However the cavalry usually fought in skirmish order and would not have normally used controlled volleys, but individual aimed fire. Modern infantrymen start to engage individual targets at around 300 yards and are well trained and practiced with their weapons. Custer’s cavalry were largely not, although some of the scouts and officers would have been skilled shots out to extreme ranges. There are Indian accounts of single braves testing the cavalrymen’s fire and their bullet-proof magic by riding round them with no ill effects. The use of skirmish order should have increased the rate of fire achieved by well-motivated and trained men against that of controlled volley firing. However, there is reason to believe from modern studies of Japanese Banzai attacks in WW2, by S.L.A. Marshal, that many men do not fire at all in such circumstances. Other Army Weapons No bayonet or hand to hand weapon was issued apart from the sabre, which under Custer’s orders was left behind. Although one officer carried his sabre as a mark of his rank. Troopers privately purchased a knife for utility purposes including prising out jammed rounds. Reno’s men dug themselves in with such tools. Some, such as Bowie Knives, would have been effective hand-to-hand weapons, but most would have had minimal value. Officers purchased their own carbines or rifles for hunting purposes and an accuratised Springfield Carbine Model 1875 Officer’s rifle was made for this purpose. However any hunting weapon could have been carried including shotguns, Remington Rolling blocks or even Winchester 73 Rifles. These guns may have been left with the baggage and is unclear how many officers actually used these weapons in the battle. However, there is evidence that Reno’s men did make use of long-range hunting rifles. The narrative of John M. Ryan 1st Sgt “M” Company (in Graham 2000 p239) shows the use of non-issue long-range weapons during the battle. Ryan relates that during the fighting with Reno’s command on the bluffs, Captain French was armed with a Springfield breech-loading rifle of .50 calibre, but after firing at an Indian three times, he become so discouraged that he abandoned his rifle. Ryan further relates that he wrapped the rifle in a bedroll but later at Fort Rice, French reclaimed the rifle after finding out that Ryan had his weapon. The next day, June 26, they came under fire from a high bluff that caused the men to take cover, and one Indian was using a rifle that made a tremendous noise. The distance was too great for return fire with the Springfield carbine. Captain French asked Ryan if he could do anything, as he was the owner of “a 15-pound Sharp’s telescope rifle, calibre .45, which I had made in Bismarck before the expedition started out, and which cost me $100.” Ryan, after he got the range, fired half a dozen shots in quick succession at the bluff and caused the Indians to ceasefire and make a retreat. The story is largely corroborated by Trooper John Burkman in an account related to I.D. O’Donnell. (Glendolin D. Wagner, 1973, Old Neutriment, pp.169-70) All durin’ the twenty-fifth and sixth whilst the Indians down below was firin’up at us they was a fellow on a hill overlookin’ ours that kept poppin’ down at us with a long range buffalo gun. He was a good shot. We couldn’t see him every time his gun popped, down dropped one o’ our men or a horse or a mule. That Indian did more to pester us than all the bunch down below. Toward the last Ryan got him with a long-range gun. After the fight I went over the hill and seen him layin’ thar, the buffalo gun still in his hand, back o’ some boulder he’d piled up for breastworks. Burkman’s story seems to exaggerate the deaths on each side to make his story more interesting, but there are elements in Ryan’s story that are hard to believe. The 1874 Sharps was made in a number of different models with varying quality and accuracy. I have only once seen a period Sharps with a telescopic sight, they normally had a rear pop-up sight with a vernier scale set up to a maximum of a very optimistic 1000-1300 yards. So I suspect the telescopic sight was a later elaboration, made at a time when they were much more common. The rifles normally weighed around 9 or 10 pounds, not 15. The price of $100 is quite possible but how would a 1st Sgt have such a sum? It is more likely that Ryan salvaged the gun from a dead officer, with the intention of selling it at a later date. Custer used a .50 calibre sporting version of the Spencer Rifle in the 1867 Kansas Campaign. In about 1872 Custer had a 1866 .50-70 Trapdoor Springfield modified to a sporting appearance by reducing the fore-end to half length, and fitting a double set trigger mechanism within a special trigger guard with a long rearward scroll. He is known to have written to Remington congratulating them on their new Rolling Block Rifle after successfully using a .50 deluxe model on a hunt. He owned at least two Remington Rolling Block Sporters, one with a straight-wrist butt and the other a Remington Creedmoor in .44 with a pistol-grip, and a folding tang sight. Wilson believes that as the Remington Rolling Block .50 is missing from the surviving collection of Custer guns it was captured by Indians at the Little Bighorn. Both Godfrey’s and Ryan’s descriptions of Custer (in Graham 2000) before the battle agree that he possessed a Remington Sporting rifle. Many officers probably bought their own revolvers even though the Colt .45 was a new design. A 1875 Smith & Wesson Schofield .45 revolver was found at the Little Bighorn by a party of surveyors in 1883. This could be an Indian gun but is much more likely to have belonged to an officer or scout. It was a break-open design meant to be easier to load on horseback. Cases from a .32 calibre Forehand and Wadsworth could possibly have been a backup up weapon used by an officer or trooper than an Indian gun. However, army regulations forbade the use of such weapons, but whether these were enforced on campaign during the Indian Wars is unclear. A Colt 1871 .44 rim-fire revolver could be an Indian weapon captured at an earlier fight or again could be a scout or officer’s gun carried over later design due to familiarity with its use. Not even obsolete percussion weapons can be ruled solely as Indian weapons as a Colt Percussion Cap revolver was supposedly captured during the battle from a white-man wearing a buckskin jacket. Scouts' Weapons Indian Scouts were apparently issued the same Springfield carbine as was issued to the troopers at the Little Bighorn. However, tintypes of Indian Scouts show lever-action weapons as well as longer range rifles and carbines. Although most sources agree that Indian scouts were not required to participate, only to guide the cavalry to the hostile Indians, a number of Indian Scouts did take part in the Battle of the Little Bighorn in the hope of capturing horses. White Scouts would have been better armed and seemed to favour long-range buffalo hunting type rifles over fast-shooting lever actions. Such long-range weapons would have been used to hold off a war party at a distance by using their deadly accuracy. Henrys, Spencers and Winchester 66s would also have been popular choices as the expense of the Winchester 73 or an Evans would have slowed down the purchase even of a well paid white scout, whose life depended on the gun he carried. Lever-action weapons would have given a scout a fighting chance against a small war-party. Some Scouts would have been armed with both types of weapons plus a variety of side arms. Custer’s Personal Weapons As a national hero, Custer, was presented with a number of guns as a means of marketing their products. Remington & Sons presented him with a New Model Army Remington .44 revolver. He also was given guns as a thank you hunting expeditions that he arranged for various V.I.Ps. J.B.Sutherland gave him a pair of silver-plated and engraved .32 No. 2 Smith & Wesson Revolvers. Lord Berkeley Paget presented both Custer and his brother Tom with English Galand & Sommerville .44 Revolvers as a thank you for organising a hunt (see Figure 4). These had an early double-action mechanism, which would have made firing on horseback easier but did not allow for aimed single-action fire by pulling the hammer back first. The Galand and Sommerville was a “self-extracting” revolver that was broken up with the empty cases lifted up from the chamber at the sametime. This made loading the revolver much faster than it took to load an American gate-loaded pistol such as the Peacemaker. Most sources claim that General Custer used a pair of Webley “British Bulldog” Revolvers at the Little Bighorn (see for instance John Walter “The Guns That Won The West.” 1999). This idea is probably based on a report given by Brigadier-General (then Major) E.S. Godfrey on January 16, 1896 (in Graham p345) that Custer carried “two Bulldog self-cocking, English, white-handled pistols, with a ring in the butt for a lanyard. The problem with this is that the Webley “British Bulldog” was not made until 1878. This was a short-barrelled and double-action revolver that was made in pocket and small belt-sized. The misidentification of guns is common in western history but there is usually some germ of truth in them. It may be that the gun was the earlier 1867 Webley R.I.C. Revolver No 1 (see Figure 3) that the later civilian “British Bulldog” was based upon. (It was called the R.I.C. because the Royal Irish Constabulary adopted it.) These guns typically had short barrels 3.5-4” were loaded via a loading gate and were double-action. It is unlikely that Custer had the latter No 2. Version, as this only came out in 1876. The Webley British Bulldog proved to be a popular gun and the name was later used to promote a number of cheap copies including some made in the US. R.L. Wilson (The Peacemakers Arms And Adventure In the American West 1992) gives another possibility, he calls the Galand & Sommerville, a Webley-Galand & Sommerville and implies that two of these guns were carried by Custer at the Little Bighorn. These guns had nothing to do with P.Webley and Son and were produced by Braendlin & Sommerville of Birmingham. Galand was a Belgian gun-designer and Sommerville was his co-patentee for the case extracting system. As an English gun it would be quite possible for the gun to acquire the more famous Webley name on the Western frontier. As we know that Custer had been given one of these guns, he may have used it, liked the gun and so acquired another for service use. Ryan’s (Graham 2000 p 346) description of Custer’s arms is that carried two pistols, “one a .45-caliber Colt, and the other a French Navy”. The Webley Bulldog was the subject of a cheap Belgian copy, so could be described as French. The Galand could also be described as French. Interestingly, the Webley and all its copies were made with a lanyard ring but the Galand & Sommerville never was. As the Webley was small, sized and gate loaded, there would be reason to carry two guns to offset its small size, but why bother to carry two large belt sized revolvers, when the Galand & Sommerville was sold on being quick to load? Custer is also known on one occasion to have been given a derringer pistol in case of capture before going into an Indian encampment under a truce. The fear of Indian mutilation whilst an officer was still a live may have made the ‘secret’ carrying of such weapons a common practice. One eyewitness claim about the body of Custer is that he shot himself in the head with a derringer type pistol. |
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